Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model
Year of publication: |
2004-09
|
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Authors: | Gowrisankaran, Gautam ; Mitchell, Matthew F. ; Moro, Andrea |
Institutions: | National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | PE Number 10748 |
Classification: | H1 - Structure and Scope of Government ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation ; C5 - Econometric Modeling |
Source: |
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