Why Do Incumbent Senators Win? Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model
| Year of publication: |
[2021]
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gowrisankaran, Gautam ; Mitchell, Matthew F. ; Moro, Andrea |
| Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
| Subject: | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Wahl | Election | Dynamische Wirtschaftstheorie | Economic dynamics |
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (35 p) |
|---|---|
| Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w10748 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2004 erstellt |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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