Why do politicians implement central bank independence reforms?
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellström, Jörgen ; Landström, Mats |
Published in: |
Atlantic economic journal : AEJ. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0197-4254, ZDB-ID 188752-X. - Vol. 41.2013, 4, p. 427-438
|
Subject: | Inflation | Institutional reforms | Monetary policy | Time-inconsistency | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Geldpolitik | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Welt | World | Inflationsbekämpfung | Anti-inflation policy |
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