Why do vacant houses sell for less : holding costs, bargaining power or stigma?
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Turnbull, Geoffrey K. ; Zahirovic-Herbert, Velma |
Published in: |
Real estate economics : journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. - Malden, MA : Wiley Periodicals, Inc., ISSN 1080-8620, ZDB-ID 1234653-6. - Vol. 39.2011, 1, p. 19-43
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Subject: | Wohnungsmarkt | Housing market | Immobilienpreis | Real estate price | Verhandlungsmacht | Bargaining power | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Externer Effekt | Externalities | USA | United States | 1984-2005 |
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