Why don’t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? The effect of securitization
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Adelino, Manuel ; Gerardi, Kristopher ; Willen, Paul |
Publisher: |
Atlanta, GA : Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta |
Subject: | Hypothekenbank | Kreditgeschäft | Subprime-Hypothek | Verhandlungen | Risiko | Insolvenz | USA | mortgage | foreclosure | modification | renegotiation |
Series: | Working Paper ; 2009-17a |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 608694266 [GVK] hdl:10419/70733 [Handle] |
Classification: | D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages |
Source: |
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