Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Burkart, Mike |
Other Persons: | Gromb, Denis (contributor) ; Panunzi, Fausto (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of political economy. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. Press, ISSN 0022-3808, ZDB-ID 3026-0. - Vol. 106.1998, 1, p. 172-204
|
Subject: | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Übernahme | Takeover | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Kleinaktionäre | Small shareholders | Theorie | Theory |
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