Why informationally diverse teams need not form, even when efficient
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Kambhampati, Ashwin ; Segura-Rodriguez, Carlos ; Shao, Peng |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1879-1751, ZDB-ID 1460618-5. - Vol. 226.2024, Art.-No. 106689, p. 1-14
|
| Subject: | Matching | Teams | Information acquisition | Correlation | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Diversity Management | Diversity management | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Korrelation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour |
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