Why it pays to conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information
Eberhard Feess; Michael Schieble; Markus Walzl
| Year of publication: |
2011
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Feess, Eberhard ; Schieble, Michael ; Walzl, Markus |
| Published in: |
German economic review. - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1465-6485, ZDB-ID 1481108-X. - Vol. 12.2011, 1, p. 100-123
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| Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Zeit | Time | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009129655