Why negotiation with a single syndicate may be preferred to making syndicates compete : the problem of trapped bidders
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hansen, Robert S. |
Other Persons: | Khanna, Naveen (contributor) |
Published in: |
The journal of business : B. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0021-9398, ZDB-ID 241617-7. - Vol. 67.1994, 3, p. 423-457
|
Subject: | Emissionsgeschäft | Underwriting business | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Theorie | Theory | Schätzung | Estimation | Versorgungswirtschaft | Public utilities | USA | United States | 1972-1981 |
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