With Additional Enforcement Mechanisms, does Collateral Avoid Ponzi Schemes?
Year of publication: |
2008-05
|
---|---|
Authors: | Revil, Thiago ; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo |
Institutions: | Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Economía y Negocios |
Subject: | Effective default enforcements | Collateral guarantees | Individual's optimality |
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