WTO Dispute Settlement : Improving Access and Transparency?

International organizations (IOs) have been increasingly criticized because of their apparent democratic deficit. At the same time, legal mechanisms have emerged as a key element of international organizations. Existing literature has shown that legal processes can improve the democratic nature of IOs because they can serve as access points for non-state actors' participation and enhance transparency as fact-finding forums. While there is evidence suggesting that legal processes can improve IOs democratic processes, it is unclear why international organizations opt for legal processes that are inclusive and transparent. Since1999 member states have negotiated modifications to the WTO's dispute settlement process. Among other things, contention over access and transparency has halted these negotiations and no changes have been made. Evaluating the negotiations to modify the WTO's dispute settlement process, this paper moves beyond the debate over whether IOs are democratic; rather, it considers the factors that shape decisions of institutional design that have an consequences for democratizing IOs. Examine three explanations - functional efficiency, norm entrepreneurship and asymmetric power - I ask: Why did attempts to reform the WTO dispute settlement not result in greater access and transparency?