Zheng’s Optimal Mechanism with Resale and the Second-Price Auction

We show that Zheng (2002)’s optimal mechanism in the presence of resale can be interpreted as an equilibrium of an ascending-price auction and, in the two-bidder case, as an equilibrium with a no-regret property of the English and second-price auctions. We also show that it can be extended beyond Zheng (2002)’s original assumptions

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Lebrun, Bernard
Institutions:	Department of Economics, York University
Subject:	Zheng’s mechanism \| optimality \| resale \| second-price auction \| independent private values

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	28 pages
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005435829