//--> //--> //-->
Toggle navigation
Logout
Change account settings
EN
DE
ES
FR
A-Z
Beta
About EconBiz
News
Thesaurus (STW)
Research Skills
Help
EN
DE
ES
FR
My account
Logout
Change account settings
Login
Publications
Events
Your search terms
Search
Retain my current filters
person:"Kübler, Dorothea"
~isPartOf:"Review of economic design : RED"
~person:"Baharad, Eyal"
Search options
All Fields
Title
Exact title
Subject
Author
Institution
ISBN/ISSN
Published in...
Publisher
Open Access only
Advanced
Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites
Loans
Reservations
Fines
You are here:
Home
Search: subject_exact:"Paradox of voting"
Narrow search
Delete all filters
| 3 applied filters
Year of publication
From:
To:
Subject
All
Abstimmungsregel
1
Condorcet-Paradoxon
1
Neue politische Ökonomie
1
Paradox of voting
1
Public choice
1
Theorie
1
Theory
1
Voting rule
1
more ...
less ...
Type of publication
All
Article
1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Article in journal
1
Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
1
Language
All
English
1
Author
All
Kübler, Dorothea
Baharad, Eyal
Campbell, Donald E.
1
Gehrlein, William V.
1
Kelly, Jerry S.
1
Neeman, Zvika
1
Published in...
All
Review of economic design : RED
Bar-Ilan University Department of Economics Research Paper
2
CESifo Working Paper Series
1
CESifo working papers
1
Department working papers / Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
1
Public choice
1
SFB 649 Discussion Paper
1
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
1
SFB 649 discussion paper
1
Social choice and welfare
1
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science
1
more ...
less ...
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW)
1
Showing
1
-
1
of
1
Sort
relevance
articles prioritized
date (newest first)
date (oldest first)
1
The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and condorcet consistent rules
Baharad, Eyal
;
Neeman, Zvika
- In:
Review of economic design : RED
7
(
2002
)
3
,
pp. 331-340
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001736526
Saved in:
Results per page
10
25
50
100
250
A service of the
zbw
×
Loading...
//-->