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~subject:"severance pay"
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Search: subject:"Moral hazard"
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severance pay
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Parsons, Donald O.
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Ferrer, Ana M.
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1
Unemployment insurance savings accounts in Latin America: Overview and assessment
Ferrer, Ana M.
;
Riddell, W. Craig
-
2011
the
moral
hazard
problems associated with traditional insurance methods. However, it presents problems of its own. First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278335
Saved in:
2
Double-sided
moral
hazard
in job displacement insurance contracts
Parsons, Donald O.
-
2011
Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280678
Saved in:
3
The Simple Analytics of Job Displacement Insurance
Parsons, Donald O.
-
2016
generalized replacement ratio measure of adequacy). Job search
moral
hazard
and layoff
moral
hazard
(firing costs), individually …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479341
Saved in:
4
Job Displacement Insurance: A Policy Typology
Parsons, Donald O.
-
2016
Efforts to insure long-tenured displacement workers against earnings losses from unemployment spells and lower wages on subsequent jobs have led to an array of government and employer programs. A policy typology is proposed to impose order on these programmatic efforts. The basic typology...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479383
Saved in:
5
Understanding Severance Pay
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2013
insurance and, if search
moral
hazard
is a problem, as scheduled UI. Like any firm-financed separation expenditure, severance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884124
Saved in:
6
Understanding Severance Pay
Parsons, Donald O.
-
2013
insurance and, if search
moral
hazard
is a problem, as scheduled UI. Like any firm-financed separation expenditure, severance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328935
Saved in:
7
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: Overview and Assessment
Ferrer, Ana
;
Riddell, W. Craig
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
the
moral
hazard
problems associated with traditional insurance methods. However, it presents problems of its own. First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008868138
Saved in:
8
Double-Sided
Moral
Hazard
in Job Displacement Insurance Contracts
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
Job displacement insurance typically includes both unemployment benefits and lump-sum severance pay, and each has provoked policy concerns. Unemployment insurance concerns have centered on distorted job search/offer acceptance decisions by the worker, severance-induced firing cost concerns on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323545
Saved in:
9
Severance Pay Mandates: Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors
Parsons, Donald O.
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
-
2011
The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that empirically the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225769
Saved in:
10
Severance pay mandates: Firing costs, hiring costs, and firm avoidance behaviors
Parsons, Donald O.
-
2011
The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple - a bonding scheme would do - but that empirically the labor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278733
Saved in:
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