In this paper, spatial competition between two sellers in a market (Hotelling, 1929) and total transportation costs minimization (Weber, 1909) are combined, and equilibrium and optimum locations of firms are analyzed along with the consequent policy implications. We reveal that when the output...

This study addresses the role of government in reducing media bias that arises from the demand side. Introducing a public-interest media outlet reduces the equilibrium slants that would otherwise exist under laissez-faire. Subsidy for the truthful report and price regulation are designed to...

This paper extends the Hotelling model of spatial competition by incorporating the production technology and labor inputs. A duopolistic game is constructed in which firms choose their locations simultaneously in the first stage, and decide the prices of the product and wages of labor in the...

Based on a lifetime consideration, previous research has extended Frank’s graphical model with borrowing, property taxes and moving costs to analyse the welfare effects of housing appreciation and depreciation, and has shown that appreciation can make homeowners worse off, but...

This article establishes a 2-sided media market in which readers have heterogeneous beliefs, media outlets choose their reporting biases, and advertisement prices are determined by bargaining between media outlets and advertisers. The authors have shown that the presence of advertisers...

type="main" xml:lang="es" <title type="main">Resumen</title> <p>Este artículo investiga la teoría de la discriminación espacial para demandas generales y costos de transporte generales en un modelo de concentración en dos extremos (barbell), donde se supone que las ubicaciones de los mercados están en puntos totalmente...</p>

<Para ID="Par1">Dispersed consumer amenities such as shopping and cultural attractions greatly influence land use patterns and rent gradients. Lai and Tsai (J Urban Econ 63:536–543, <CitationRef CitationID="CR9">2008</CitationRef>) generalize the traditional Alonso–Mills–Muth model by introducing a monopoly vendor and show that the vendor will...</citationref></para>

This paper generalizes Hwang and Mai’s (Am Econ Rev 80:567–575, <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1990</CitationRef>) model to include labor markets and shows that their results are still valid when the difference of inverse demand slopes is large enough, while, when this difference is small, a monopoly firm always chooses the same...</citationref>

d’Aspremont (Econometrica 47:1145–1150 , <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1979</CitationRef>) showed that a Hotelling (Econ J 39:41–57 , <CitationRef CitationID="CR10">1929</CitationRef>) duopoly model with quadratic transport costs yields maximal differentiation. However, the introducing of an online firm ensures that the duopolist will never be located at the end points of the...</citationref></citationref>

This paper extends Hwang and Mai (Am Econ Rev 80:567–575, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">1990</CitationRef>) with an intermediate market to discuss the spatial pricing and social welfare. It is shown that the monopoly will always locate at this intermediate market under discriminatory pricing. Under simple mill pricing, the intermediate...</citationref>