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~person:"Klein, Alexander"
~subject:"Moral Hazard"
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Search: subject:"incentive contracts"
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Moral Hazard
Fairness
5
Incentive Contracts
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Incomplete Contracts
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Incentive contracts
3
fairness
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incomplete contracts
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moral hazard
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reciprocity
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Klein, Alexander
Fehr, Ernst
6
Schmidt, Klaus M.
6
Helm, Carsten
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Roelfsema, Hein
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Dittrich, Marcus
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Hili, Amal
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Ishiguro, Shingo
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Laussel, Didier
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Long, Ngo Van
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Malcomson, James M.
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Städter, Silvio
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Demougin, Dominique
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Demougin, Dominique M.
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Dur, Robert
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Dur, Robert A. J.
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Non, Jan Adrianus
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1
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
2001
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427345
Saved in:
2
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, …
-
2001
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649790
Saved in:
3
Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
2001
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105
Saved in:
4
Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
2001
-
This version: February 2001
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440969
Saved in:
5
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
-
2001
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792499
Saved in:
6
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fehr, Ernst
;
Klein, Alexander
;
Schmidt, Klaus M.
-
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
hazard context.
Incentive
contracts
that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627919
Saved in:
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