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  • Search: institution:"Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale University"
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Subject
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Axiomatic bargaining theory 1 Nash's bargaining solution 1 dynamic foundations 1 judicial precedent 1
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Free 1
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Article 1
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Undetermined 1
Author
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John E. Roemer 1 Marc Fleurbaey 1
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CNRS and Université Paris Descartes 1 Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale University 1
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BASE 1
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Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory
Marc Fleurbaey; John E. Roemer - CNRS and Université Paris Descartes; Departments of … - 2011
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash's theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in an (infinite) sequence of...
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