We show that the fact that farmers in a cooperative individually decide how much to supply to cooperative may serve as a commitment device for credibility (and profitably) gaining market share in competition with a profit maximizing firm.

With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogenous innovator and imitator. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity - market shares, R&D shares, and profits - depend on spillovers and on R&D costs....

Stricter competition policy reduces expected payoffs before and after innovation, but reduces pre-innovation payoffs relatively more than post-innovation payoffs, and therefore increases the equilibrium level of R&D activity: tough product-market competition policy stimulates innovation. There...

We analyze a model of a firm with more than one significant owner (a situation common in close corporations). In particular, we are interested in the optimal ownership structure chosen by the founder of the firm. We show that , by distributing control among several shareholders, the founder...

We study the role of two-part transfer schemes as signals of consumer demand from a privately informed franchisor to an uninformed franchisee. Distortions in the wholesale price and the up-front franchise fee offered by the high demand franchisor may possibly separate the different types of...

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or...

In this paper we analyse the determinants of R&D spending in Danish firms and firms and industries in the nineties. We also examine the complementarity and substitution between publicly and company financed spending taking into account the influence from market structure, barriers of entry,...

We model green markets in which purchasers, either firms or consumers, have higher willingness-to-pay for less polluting goods. The effectiveness of pollution reduction policies is examined in a duopoly setting. We show that duopolists´ strategic behaviour may increase pollution levels. Maximum...

We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator...

We provide an extensive comparison of the R&D models of d'Aspremont-Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien-Muller-Zang (1992), exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and policy prescriptions. Using three separate formal and/or intuitive criteria, we argue that the first model is invalid for...