Did everything change so nothing changes? Argentina’s merger control system was substantially reformed in May 2018. Since then, that question resonates insistently: did everything change so that nothing changes? The new Competition Law 27,442 (LDC) established in 2018 a real pre-merger control...

Should competition law prohibit competitors from agreeing to produce more energy-efficient goods, where this means higher prices for consumers? Is a dominant undertaking that switches to using only pricier recyclable packaging abusing its dominant position? Can the fact that a merger may lead to...

The green antitrust movement aims to increase sustainability efforts by allowing restrictions of competition. Yet the economic evidence so far points to more, not less, competition as the right stimulus for inducing sustainability efforts. Incentives to produce more sustainably are stronger when...

While Japan is aging rapidly and the local communities in rural areas are struggling to maintain their essential societal function, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has revised the merger guidelines to allow for mergers that create a monopoly. Under the new approach, which the author calls...

We discuss various theoretical and empirical hurdles that antitrust authorities and courts must overcome to determine appropriate cartel sanctions, namely regarding the probability of detection, cartel dynamics, cartel duration, and cartel overcharge

The note summarizes and comments on the European Commission's decision to approve Google's acquisition of Fitbit, a maker of fitness trackers and smartwatches. The Commission approved the deal in December 2020, but made long-lasting behavioural remedies binding on Google. The case constitutes...

With the launch of the Opening-Up and Reform Policy in the late 1970's, China has undertaken the difficult transition from a planned economy to a market economy. In parallel with the significant economic reforms, China's legal system has been remodelled. The Anti-Monopoly Law is a key law in...

This paper considers the implications of Generics and Budapest Bank for the legal treatment of vertical restraints (in particular in the context of the ongoing review of the Block Exemption Regulation). The analysis focuses on two of the main justifications for vertical restraints, namely brand...

Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 obliges the competition authorities of the EU Member States (national competition authorities or NCAs) to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (EU antitrust law) whenever they apply national competition law to conduct falling within the scope of EU antitrust law....

In the European Union, the ne bis in idem principle restricts the ability of EU and national enforcement authorities to prosecute or punish the same defendant for the same criminal offence more than once. That protection applies to competition fines due to its punitive and deterrent natures and...