Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...

The database directive, initiated by the European Commission in 1992 and due to be finalised in the near future, establishes a two-tiered system of protection, amending copyright with a sui generis rule that grants protection against unfair extraction. The terms of protection are extended if the...

The database directive, initiated by the European Commission in 1992 and due to be finalised in the near future, establishes a two-tiered system of protection, amending copyright with a sui generis rule that grants protection against unfair extraction. The terms of protection are extended if the...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...

This paper develops a simple model that allows to analyze the rationale for the protection of intellectual property and to derive the conditions that an optimal form of protection has to meet. It is shown that not only a reason for the limitation of intellectual property rights does exist, but...

Using James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as...

The paper gives a working definition of "cultural heritage" as collection of tangible objects related to the cultural development of a society that are inherited from past generations and are valued by contemporaries as an expression of this cultural development. The potential benefits and costs...

The paper shows that being able to forecast another player's actual cooperation better than pure chance can change players' strategic incentives in a one-shot simultaneous PD-situation. In particular, it is shown that if both players have such ability (to forecast each others' actual choices...

This paper develops a simple model that allows to analyze the rationale for the protection of intellectual property and to derive the conditions that an optimal form of protection has to meet. It is shown that not only a reason for the limitation of intellectual property rights does exist, but...

Using James Buchanan's "Samaritan's Dilemma" as a basic example, this paper analyses the problems that have to be solved if strategic behavior is necessary to escape from dilemma situations by changing the opponents' incentives. These problems are addressed within one-shot games as well as...