Der Richtlinienentwurf der EU-Kommission zur europaweiten Einführung eines Folgerechts auf Kunstwerke ist dazu gedacht, die öknomische Lage junger Künstler zu verbessern. Eine einfache preistheoretische Überlegung zeigt jedoch, daß dieses Ziel verfehlt werden dürfte. Außerdem analysiert...

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Even if the expected punishment on tax evasion is negligible, empirical studies show that actual tax evasion is smaller than rational choice models predict. In addition to this, tax payer do not respond on parameter changes as predicted. Some authors tried to explain this puzzle by assuming "tax...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...

Law and economics in Germany was dominated by regulation, competition, and ?German Ordnungspolitik? until the early 1970s. Since then, German scholars have published a broad body of work in German and in the English language, covering fields like contract law, environmental law, labor law,...

In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Ius Commune describes the spontaneous development of a european contract law by adaptive behavior of contracting parties to competing law systems and their interpretations by jursidiction. The idea of spontaneous law harmonization is appealing, since its result is independent of centraized...

Law and economics in Germany was dominated by regulation, competition, and 'German Ordnungspolitik' until the early 1970s. Since then, German scholars have published a broad body of work in German and in the English language, covering fields like contract law, environmental law, labor law,...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior which we call litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party...

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to prevent this, but still leaves room for litigational opportunism: Even knowing that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We show that with positive...