We study stationary mean field games with singular controls in which the representative player interacts with a long-time weighted average of the population through a discounted and an ergodic performance criterion. This class of games finds natural applications in the context of optimal...

This paper deals with a nonlinear filtering problem in which a multi-dimensional signal process is additively affected by a process v whose components have paths of bounded variation. The presence of the process v prevents from directly applying classical results and novel estimates need to be...

This paper proposes and solves an optimal dividend problem in which a two-state regimeswitching environment affects the dynamics of the company's cash surplus and, as a novel feature, also the bankruptcy level. The aim is to maximize the total expected profits from dividends until bankruptcy....

We study the problem of optimally managing an inventory with unknown demand trend. Our formulation leads to a stochastic control problem under partial observation, in which a Brownian motion with non-observable drift can be singularly controlled in both an upward and downward direction. We first...

A designer conducts random searches to detect criminals, and may condition the search probability on individuals' appearance. She updates her belief about the distribution of criminals across appearances using her search results, but incorrectly takes her sample distribution for the population...

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash...

We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which at each possible partition any new coalition can decide the probability with which to form and leave the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players can decide whether or not to support a coalition's...

We study a signaling game of common interest in which a stochastic noise is perturbing the communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Despite this inhibiting factor, efficient languages exist. In equilibrium, sender uses a tessellation consisting of convex cells while...

We concern a sender-receiver game of common interests having infinite types, e.g the set [0; 1]², but with finite signals. In our paper, we extend the game by introducing multiple priors over the type space and use incomplete preferences in Bewley's way. We characterize the equilibria under...