This paper studies the implications of a segmented labor market with efficient wage-employment bargaining on the internal labor market and a competitive external labor market on the temporary equilibrium of a closed monetary macroeconomy of the AS-AD type with government activity, fiat money,...

Empirical studies show that female workers are under-represented in highest hierarchical positions of companies, which is known as the glass-ceiling effect. In this study we investigate the relationship between social networks and the glass-ceiling effect. Specifically, we develop an equilibrium...

We study a model of transmission of continuous cultural traits across generations where children learn their cultural trait from their parents and their social environment modeled by a network. Parents can engage in the socialization process of their children by biasing links in the network in...

We consider a robust version of the full information best choice problem (Gilbert and Mosteller (1966)): there is ambiguity (represented by a set of priors) about the measure driving the observed process. We solve the problem under a very general class of multiple priors in the setting of Riedel...

This paper continues the treatise of vNM Stable Sets for totally balanced (cooperative) games with a continuum of players. We generalize and extend the results obtained by a series of presentations of this topic (Part I, II, III, IV see [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]). Thus, the coalitional function is...

A price-maker company extracts an exhaustible commodity from a reservoir, and sells it instantaneously in the spot market. In absence of any actions of the company, the commodity's spot price evolves either as a drifted Brownian motion or as an Ornstein- Uhlenbeck process. While extracting, the...

This paper develops a search and matching model with heterogeneous firms, on-the-job search by workers, Nash bargaining over wages and adaptive learning. We assume that workers are boundedly rational in the sense that they do not have perfect foresight about the outcome of wage bargaining....

This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information. Under these conditions players form subjective prior...

We consider a robust version of the full information best choice problem (Gilbert and Mosteller (1966)): there is ambiguity (represented by a set of priors) about the measure driving the observed process. We solve the problem under a very general class of multiple priors in the setting of Riedel...

This paper continues the treatise of vNM Stable Sets for totally balanced (cooperative) games with a continuum of players. We generalize and extend the results obtained by a series of presentations of this topic (Part I, II, III, IV see [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]). Thus, the coalitional function is...