Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...

This paper incorporates social networks into a frictional labour market framework. There are two worker types and two occupations. Both occupations are subject to correlated business cycle fluctuations in labour demand. The equilibrium in this model is characterized by occupational mismatch...

In this paper, the search model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms are uncertain about the job seekers' number of friends, who can help them in the job search (social capital). All workers have the same productivity and differ only in the social capital. A firm offers a take-it-or-leave-it...

This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for a strategic timing problem, where two firms have the (real) option to invest irreversibly in some market. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis of the problem emphasizes its...

Within this paper we establish the existence of a vNM-Stable Set for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered" production...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

The question of how to optimally design an infrastructure network that may be subject to intelligent threats is of highest interest. We address this problem by considering a Designer-Adversary game of optimal network design for the case of imperfect node defense. In this two-stage game, first...

The so-called El Farol problem describes a prototypical situation of interacting agents making binary choices to participate in a non-cooperative environment or to stay by themselves and choosing an outside option. In a much cited paper Arthur (1994) argues that persistent on-converging...

We prove a lifting theorem, in the sense of Robinsonian nonstandard analysis, for the G-expectation. Herein, we use an existing discretization theorem for the G-expectation by T. Fadina and F. Herzberg (Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers, 503,...

The total output of an economy usually follows cyclical movements which are accompanied by similar movements in stock prices. The common explanation relies on the demand side. It points out that stock market wealth drives consumption which triggers production afterward. This paper focuses on...