Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition.The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no...

The present paper considers a class of general equilibrium economics when the primitive uncertainty model features uncertainty about continuous-time volatility. This requires a set of mutually singular priors, which do not share the same null sets. For this setting we introduce an appropriate...

I analyze a monopolistic model of quality uncertainty but with the possibility of information acquisition on the consumer side. Information is costly and its amount is chosen by the consumer. The analysis of Bayesian equilibria shows the possibility of three equilibrium classes, only one of...

First via a counter example it is shown that the Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient...

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive. -- Additivity ;...

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions...

We solve an optimal growth model in continuous space, continuous and bounded time. The optimizer chooses the optimal trajectories of capital and consumption across space and time by maximizing an objective function with both space and time discounting. We extract the corresponding Pontryagin...

The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition...

Within this paper we study the Minkowski sum of prisms ("Cephoids") in a finite dimensional vector space. We provide a representation of a finite sum of prisms in terms of inequalities. -- Convex analysis ; Minkowski sum ; polytopes