This paper investigates an oligopolistic market with vertical product differentiation, where qualities are represented by a uni-dimensional interval. We examine the Nash equilibrium in the oligopoly game with a finite number of consumers, where each firm uses its technology and can offer a range...

In this paper, we formulate a model prescribing optimal policy for cash disbursements and seasoned equity offerings taking into account the principal-agent problems inherent in these decisions. In order to discipline managers, stockholders demand that excess free cash flow be disbursed either as...

A substantial portion of information goods is sold through upgrades. I model a monopolist offering successive generations of an information good in a dynamic model. In each period, the monopolist offers up to two prices for each generation: a full price to those who have never purchased and a...

This paper explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. To mitigate hold-up we allow the parties to stage investments over time and derive the optimal...

It is a common practice for governments to offer scrappage subsidies in order to stimulate the early removal of used cars and modify the distribution of vehicle holdings. In this paper, we analyze the market implications of such subsidies when producers have market power and face competition...

This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders' value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners' values...

The paper studies the concept of ``ex post equilibrium" that has recently become popular in literature on auctions, mechanism design and implementation. We ask how one should define ex post equilibrium if one wants to consider extensive games, such as dynamic auctions, and if one wants to...

We characterize the steady state of a market with random matching and bargaining, where the sellers' goods can perish overnight. Generically, the quantity traded is suboptimal, prices are dispersed and there is a dead-weight loss caused by excess supply or demand. In the limit as the cost of...

We apply the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set to the n-player cake division problem. Only time-preferences á la Rubinstein (1982) are assumed. The stable set is defined with respect to the following dominance relation: x dominates y if there is a player who prefers x over y even with one...

In rational beliefs (RB) models there is an observed empirical distribution for the stochastic process of state variables. Many different weakly asymptotic mean stationary (WAMS) processes could have generated this empirical distribution, i.e. are consistent with it, and each of them are...