We consider a model of bribery in an asymmetric procurement auction. In return for a bribe from the dishonest supplier, the auctioneer has the discretion to allow this supplier to revise his bid downward to match the low bid of the honest supplier. The dishonest supplier can also win the...

We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the players' efforts in equilibrium do not depend on the expected prize in the case of a tie given that this prize is smaller than the prize for winning. The implications of this result...

The paper investigates the impact of examinations on incentives and decision-making in bureaucracies and similar organisations. When one amongst a group of bureaucrats can be appointed to give policy advice whose outcome affects all parties, with advisory ability increasing in personal effort, a...

Recently, it has been claimed that full-information multiple equilibria in games with strategic complementarities are not robust, because generalizing to allow slightly heterogeneous information implies uniqueness. This paper argues that this "global games" uniqueness result is itself not...

Several studies have recently adopted the segmented markets model as a framework for monetary analysis. The characteristic assumption is that some households never participate in financial markets. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium for segmented markets models where monetary...

A distributed system model is studied, where individual agents play repeatedly against each other and change their strategies based upon previous play. It is shown how to model this environment in terms of continuous population densities of agent types. A complication arises because the...

This paper analyzes the dynamics of completely decentralized bilateral exchange. In such a framework, neither money nor prices as public information exist. Rather, prices represent an agent's barter strategy, and hence are private information. We call these private prices. Agents formulate trade...

A bilateral trading model with investment is considered. In a "cooperative" investment version of the model, the seller's investment stochastically determines the buyer's valuation of the good. The value and cost of the good are realized only after the investment is made, and the investment...

This paper extends the Downsian-Hotelling model of electoral competition to allow for unobserved qualitative differences between candidates. I show that these underlying qualitative differences generate pure strategy Nash equilibria, even if policies are defined in a multidimensional space, and...

I study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where the payment is a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids. A recursive method to explicitly compute...