A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation.Robust monotonicity is strictly...

In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if...

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of equilibrium theory; then...

I use the theories of duality and optimal branchings to find a necessary and sufficient characterization of stochastically stable limit sets (SSLS) that helps improve the radius - modified coradius test of Ellison (2000). The improved shortcut I offer may permit the identification of SSLS when...

This paper takes a somewhat different approach from the recent literature in estimating exchange rate equations. It assumes uncovered interest rate parity and models how expectations are formed. Agents are assumed to base their expectations of future interest rates and prices, which are needed...

This paper begins with the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates with constant term premia and then postulates how expectations of future short term interest rates are formed. Expectations depend in part on predictions from a set of VAR equations and in part on the current...