We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages when there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

We survey the recent literature on the role of information for mechanism design. We specifically consider the role of endogeneity of and robustness to private information in mechanism design. We view information acquisition of and robustness to private information as two distinct but related...

The life-cycle accounts proposal for Social Security reform has been justified by its proponents using a number of different arguments, but these arguments generally involve the assumption of a high likelihood of good returns on the accounts. A simulation is undertaken to estimate the...

The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow default subject to penalties to appririate credit limits and default penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that...

We introduce grading into games of status. Each player chooses effort, producing a stochastic output or score. Utilities depend on the ranking of all the scores. By clustering scores into grades, the ranking is coarsened, and the incentives to work are changed. We first apply games of status to...

This paper develops a linearity test that can be applied to cointegrating relations. We consider the widely used RESET specification test and show that when this test is applied to nonstationary time series its asymptotic distribution involves a mixture of noncentral chi^2 distributions, which...

We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and...

An asymptotic theory is given for autoregressive time series with a root of the form rho_{n} = 1+c/n^{alpha}, which represents moderate deviations from unity when alpha in (0,1). The limit theory is obtained using a combination of a functional law to a diffusion on D[0,infinity) and a central...

A general equilibrium analysis of monopoly power is proposed as an alternative to the partial equilibrium analyses of monopolization common to most antitrust texts. This analysis introduces the notion of a cost minimizing market equilibrium. The empirical implications of this equilibrium concept...

First order autoregression is shown to satisfy a limit theory which is uniform over stationary values of the autoregressive coefficient rho = rho_{n} in [0,1) provided (1 - rho_{n})n approaches infinity. This extends existing Gaussian limit theory by allowing for values of stationary rho that...