EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: isPartOf:"Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Online availability
All
Free 180
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 410
Language
All
Undetermined 272 English 137 German 1
Author
All
Ulph, A. 23 Malcomson, J.M. 15 Aldrich, J. 10 Kugler, Maurice 10 Qizilbash, M. 10 Aldrich, John 9 Kwiek, Maksymilian 9 Chalkley, M. 8 Lee, I.H. 7 Mateos-Planas, Xavier 7 Shin, H.S. 7 Sola, M. 7 Ulph, Alistair 7 Armstrong, M. 6 Blackburn, K. 6 Gervais, Martin 6 Ioannou, Christos A. 6 Lu, M. 6 MacLeod, W.B. 6 Mizon, G.E. 6 Tonin, Mirco 6 Mason, R. 5 Mountford, A. 5 Pitarakis, Jean-Yves 5 Smith, P. 5 Ulph, D. 5 Wahba, J. 5 Anderlini, L. 4 Galanis, Spyros 4 Gill, David 4 Hoffmann, Mathias 4 Hung, V.T.Y. 4 Ianni, A. 4 Ianni, Antonella 4 Kugler, Adriana 4 McCormick, B. 4 Mizon, Grayham E. 4 Mukerji, S. 4 Rice, Patricia 4 Stewart, Geoff 4
more ... less ...
Institution
All
Economics Division, University of Southampton 410
Published in...
All
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 410
Source
All
RePEc 410
Showing 241 - 250 of 410
Cover Image
Learning correlated equilibria in normal form games
Ianni, A. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
We analyze a population game as being constituted by a set of players, a normal form game and an interaction pattern. The latter specifies the way players are repeatedly matched in the population to play one shot of the normal form game. We first relate the set of equilibria of the populations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401269
Saved in:
Cover Image
Bargaining power and the impact of lender liability for environmental damages
Balkenborg, D. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
Should lenders be made liable for environmental damages caused by their customers? In a recent paper Pitchford studied the case where the customer is a wealth-constrained manager-owned firm. He argued convincingly that a joint liability of lender and firm may reduce the firm's incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401270
Saved in:
Cover Image
Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
Cremer, J.; Khalil, F.; Rochet, J.-C. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401326
Saved in:
Cover Image
Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
Ulph, A. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate their environmental policies even for entirely local pollution problems; co-ordination is often taken to imply harmonisation of environmental policies to provide a 'level playing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401344
Saved in:
Cover Image
Contracts, hold-up and labor markets
Malcomson, J.M. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid hold-up of investments are assessed. Employment at will protects the returns on a firm's general and specific investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401348
Saved in:
Cover Image
On the interpretation of evolutionarily stable sets
Balkenborg, D.; Schlag, K.H. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following requirements: After every sufficiently small mutation of a population playing a single strategy in the set: a) No single mutant strategy can spread. b) A single mutant strategy not in the set will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401351
Saved in:
Cover Image
Catching up, overtaking and the growth implications of economies with land
Mountford, A. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
This paper analyzes the global dynamics of a convex overlapping generations model with land and analyzes the implications of international capital mobility in this model. It shows that this model can explain some of the stylised facts of the growth literature which cannot be explained by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062120
Saved in:
Cover Image
Fiscal policies and the terms of trade in an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations
Mourmouras, I.A.; Ghosh, S. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
This paper investigates how changes in fiscal policy can affect relative prices, optimal savings and steady state utility in a two-country, overlapping generations model of endogenous growth. We develop a simple model that combines Blanchard-type consumers with uncertain lifetimes, with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062153
Saved in:
Cover Image
Mutual encompassing and model equivalence
Lu, M.; Mizon, G.E. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
This paper analyses the properties of mutual encompassing and its relationship to the KLIC equivalence between statistical models. It is shown that models are KLIC equivalent if and only if they are mutually encompassing and mutually Cox-encompassing. Further, within the exponential family...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124811
Saved in:
Cover Image
The optimal level of regulatory commitment
Watts, C. - Economics Division, University of Southampton - 1997
We examine the relative benefits of regulatory commitment and discretion arising from the incompleteness of contracts. Full commitment gives strong incentives for investment, but leaves the regulator unable to bring prices in line with costs or gives the firm large rents. Full discretion on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124813
Saved in:
  • First
  • Prev
  • 20
  • 21
  • 22
  • 23
  • 24
  • 25
  • 26
  • 27
  • 28
  • 29
  • 30
  • Next
  • Last
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...