I develop a dynamic model of judge made law in which the ideal legal rule is unknown but can be learned. In contrast to existing papers, the flow of cases heard by the court is affected by its prior decisions. The model highlights the significance of this feedback in explaining when and why the...

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be strategically distinguished in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are...

Exploring long-term implications of valuation leads us to recover and use a distorted probability measure that reflects the long-term implications for risk pricing. This measure is typically distinct from the physical and the risk neutral measures that are well known in mathematical finance. We...

This paper develops a novel positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of an arbitrating party. Specifically, we consider a third party arbitrator mediating a one-shot...

We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in...

Nash' noncooperative and cooperative foundations for "bargaining with threats" are reinterpreted to achieve equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated two player games. The analysis is then extended to stochastic games, where players' choices affect the state transition matrix. Sufficient...

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...

Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. This paper asks the robustness of such equilibrium play with respect to private monitoring perturbations that are ex-ante close to the public-monitoring structure. We show that, in two-player games with full support...

We show that the folk theorem with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization...