Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister`s exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation...

The paper reviews the macroeconomic data describing the British economy during the industrial revolution and shows that they contain a story of dramatically increasing inequality between 1800 and 1840: GDP per worker rose 37%, real wages stagnated, and the profit rate doubled. The share of...

This paper studies the optimal allocation of coordination responsibilities in organizations where duplication of effort is a serious concern. The planner`s objective is to minimize a weighted average of the wage bill and the cost of delay. The paper provides conditions under which, in balanced...

Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where managers pay much attention to league table rankings. This paper explores the strategic rationale for giving managers incentives based on market share in an oligopoly competing in strategic substitutes. Moreover, the...

Why do people stall while bargaining? Why are people keen to conclude a deal quickly, only to subsequently allow delay before the pie is realised? We propose that the reason is not fully explained by discount rates in combination with agents being engaged in a signalling equilibrium with...

I analyze empirically the effects of both urban and industrial agglomeration on men`s and women`s search behavior and on the efficiency of matching. The analysis is based on the Italian Labor Force Survey micro-data, which covers 520 randomly drawn Local Labor Market Areas (66 per cent of the...

In a collective-action game a player`s payoff is the sum of (i) a private component that depends only on that player`s action, and (ii) a public component, common to all players and dependent upon all actions. A classic application is the private provision of a public good. Play evolves:...

In this paper we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier hierarchy. The principal contracts directly only with the supplier that produces the first input leaving him in charge of the contract for the production of the second input. We allow the principal to costlessly...

A public good is produced if and only if a team of m or more volunteers contribute to it. An equilibrium-selection problem leads to the questions: will collective action succeed? If so, who will participate in the team? The paper studies the evolution of collective action: as part of a...

In models of learning by experimentation, there is a natural benchmark of myopia when the only intertemporal link is the agent`s subjective belief (signal independence). An alternative benchmark using a passive learner has been proposed when there is a further intertemporal link that directly...