This paper presents some general-equilibrium models of the parallel market in centrally planned economies. The models are based on the hypotheses that private firms can operate more efficiently than bureaucratically-run state enterprises and that Soviet-type economies are characterized by price...

It is widely believed that the free-rider problem and the incentives to build minimum winning coalitions cause politics to reflect the preferences of special interest groups. Nevertheless, if voters do not know all the positions of all the candidates, then a candidate who proposes policies that...

In this paper we ask how to construct a tariff or quota schedule which depends on the behavior of a domestic monopsonistic monopolist in order to achieve the best tradeoff between two objectives of a government. We consider various political and economic tradeoffs which could face the policy...

The paper analyzes the phenomenon of industry-specific direct foreign investment (DFI) which occurs with the view to defusing the threat of future protection by the host country (quid pro quo), under alternative imperfectly competitive market structures. It is established that, even in the...

Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) demonstrated the interesting possibility that once revenue seeking is introduced the Metzler paradox may arise even for a small country: that is, a tariff will decrease the output of the inportable good. In this note, we establish the conditions under which the...

This paper explores the extent to which insights available from existing writings on directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities in international trade modify rules of tax and tariff reform in normative public economics and examines in what way these should affect advice on tax policy...

I examine a simple model of rent seeking behavior in order to determine the correct way to measure welfare loss due to rent seeking. I conduct this analysis using a general equilibrium version of the standard partial equilibrium consumers' surplus cost-benefit setup. I conclude that the ordinary...

John E. Roemer, Free to Lose: An Introduction to Marxist Economic Philosophy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988. Copyright 1989 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..