We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in subsequent ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and then charge exogenous participation fees according to the auction price sequences observed in...

We investigate experimentally the effect of consultation (unincentivized advice) on choices under risk in an incentivized investment task. We compare consultation to two benchmark treatments: one with isolated individual choices, and a second with group choice after communication. Our benchmark...

The paper examines in the laboratory how risk-taking situations are affected by the conditions of observing other’s choices (observer) and being observed by others (source). By extending Yechiam et al.’s (2008) experimental design to the domain of gains we find that observers are more...

The paper analyzes physiological responses to different visual representations of stressful work activities. A between-subject experiment was conducted to analyze differences in heart rate (HR) and electromyography (EMG) between subjects watching videos featuring real actors and virtual videos...

We investigate experimentally the effect of consultation (unincentivized advice) on choices under risk in an incentivized investment task. We compare these choices to two benchmark treatments: one with isolated individual choices, and a second with group choice after communication. Our...

SRTR program reports provide detailed information on transplant center performance relative to risk-adjusted expected values. Designed to improve outcomes, the behavioral implications of these reports may generate a longer wait time for transplant. UNOS data for 28,839 deceased donor kidney...

People often form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes (the so-called consensus effect). We study the implications of this for trust and trustworthiness. Trustworthy individuals are more \optimistic" than opportunists and are accordingly less afraid to engage in...

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-...

The theoretical literature has a rich characterization of scoring rules for eliciting the subjective beliefs that an individual has for continuous events, but under the restrictive assumption of risk neutrality. It is well known that risk aversion can dramatically affect the incentives to...

Using an experiment with incentivized decisions of groups in the economics laboratory, I investigate the effect of group diversity on group risk taking. I measure econometrically the effects of various aspects of subjects’ diversity: nationality, language, university degree and gender. I...