We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders. On one hand, the pooling of information within bidding rings increases the precision of competing estimates. We demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more...

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with present technologies. It provides an alternative to existing approaches, which rely on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. This quantum mechanism applies to a variety of scenarios...

We introduce neighborhood effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical discrimination in labor markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation and the likelihood and extent of statistical discrimination. As long as negative stereotypes persist in...

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in majority games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition...

In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss",...

Using insights from the theory of projective geometry one can prove convergence of continuous fictitious play in a certain class of games. As a corollary, we obtain a kind of equilibrium selection result, whereby continuous fictitious play converges to a particular equilibrium contained in a...

In a sequential decision problem at any stage a decision maker, based on the history, takes a decision and receives a payoff which depends also on the realized state of nature. A strategy, f, is said to be as good as an alternative strategy g at a sequence of states, if in the long run f does,...

Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated...

We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is...

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information by assuming that one of the colluding parties offers a side contract to the other one. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. We show that if collusion occurs...