Using techniques from the non-standard analysis, a non-standard analogue of the Aumann-Shapley random order value of non-atomic games is provided. The paper introduces the notion of effectively ergodic family of automorphism groups. It is shown that for a wide class of games, the non-standard...

We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we show that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading...

While many learning models have been proposed in the game theoretic literature to track individuals’ behavior, surprisingly little research has focused on how well these models describe human adaptation in changing dynamic environments. Analysis of human behavior demonstrates that people are...

We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing...

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

This paper applies the theory of zero-sum stochastic games to assess the validity of baseball's ancient wisdom that batting last confers a strategic advantage. Results from numerical calculation of Markov perfect equilibrium suggest that the team that bats last will have an advantage if in fact...

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.

Financial markets are to a very large extent influenced by the advent of information. Such disclosures, however, do not only contain information about fundamentals underlying the markets, but they also serve as a focal point for the beliefs of market participants. This dual role of information...

This paper introduces a measure of uncertainty in the determination of the Shapley value, illustrates it with examples, and studies some of its properties. The introduced measure of uncertainty quantifies random variations in a player's marginal contribution during the bargaining process. The...

Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do*...