We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on...

Shapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems. Ordinality refers to the covariance of the solution with respect to order-preserving transformations of utilities. The construction of this solution is based on a special feature of...

We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect information: the valuation equilibrium. The moves of each player are partitioned into similarity classes. A valuation of the player is a real valued function on the set of her similarity classes. At each node a player...

It is known that every continuous time fictitious play process approaches equilibrium in every nondegenerate 2x2 and 2x3 game, and it has been conjectured that convergence to equilibrium holds generally for 2xn games. We give a simple geometric proof of this.

Current analysis addresses an apparently critical issue of wealth circulation in the society. In the form of three persons game, we put the welfare-related burden on taxpayers. The Negotiator No.1 stands up for citizens’ legal and moral right to social services. The Negotiator No.2 proceeds...

We show that a distribution of a game with a continuum of players is an equilibrium distribution if and only if there exists a sequence of symmetric approximate equilibrium distributions of games with finite support that converges to it. Thus, although not all games have symmetric equilibrium...

We propose a new theory of choice between lotteries, which combines an 'economic’ view of decision making - based on a rational, though incomplete, ordering - with a 'psychological’ view - based on heuristics. This theory can explain observed violations of EU theory, namely all cyclical...

What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a framework and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function and a vagueness function.

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an $\varepsilon_n$-equilibria, with $\varepsilon_n$ converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games...

We incorporate information measures representing knowledge into an evolutionary model of coevolving firms and markets whereby the growing orderliness of firms potentiates a predictable progression of market exchange innovations which themselves become beneficial only with the growing orderliness...