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Subject
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game theory 15 Nash equilibrium 13 bargaining 11 learning 11 core 9 repeated games 9 Evolution 7 coordination 6 Learning 5 collusion 5 externalities 5 mechanism design 5 public goods 5 reputation 5 Fictitious Play 4 Learning Process 4 Repeated Games 4 backward induction 4 evolution 4 evolutionary stability 4 expected utility 4 partition function 4 stochastic games 4 voting 4 : bargaining 3 Asymmetric Information 3 Auctions 3 Bargaining 3 Bayesian Learning 3 Coalition formation 3 Core 3 Equilibrium Selection 3 Game theory 3 Interlinkage 3 Nash Equilibrium 3 Networks 3 Potential games 3 Repeated games 3 Trader 3 auctions 3
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Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 452
Language
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Undetermined 452
Author
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Lagunoff, Roger 19 Samet, Dov 19 Vidal-Puga, Juan 16 Oechssler, Joerg 13 Carmona, Guilherme 12 Lehrer, Ehud 11 Manzini, Paola 9 Bergantiños, Gustavo 8 Jackson, Matthew O. 8 Krishna, Vijay 8 Sethi, Rajiv 8 Berger, Ulrich 7 Echenique, Federico 7 Halpern, Joseph Y. 7 Hart, Sergiu 7 Kóczy, László Á. 7 Mariotti, Marco 7 Anderlini, Luca 6 Shalev, Jonathan 6 Huck, Steffen 5 LiCalzi, Marco 5 Montero, Maria 5 Azrieli, Yaron 4 Blume, Andreas 4 Blume, Lawrence E. 4 Chaudhuri, Sarbajit 4 Hillas, John 4 Lahiri, Somdeb 4 Monderer, Dov 4 Mullat, Joseph E. 4 Rasmusen, Eric 4 Samuelson, Larry 4 Unver, M. Utku 4 Williamson, Stephen D. 4 ALTMAN, Eitan 3 Aiyagari, S. Rao 3 Benoit, Jean-Pierre 3 Bergstrom, Ted 3 Berliant, Marcus 3 Bhaskar, V. 3
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Institution
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EconWPA 452
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Game Theory and Information 452
Source
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RePEc 452
Showing 321 - 330 of 452
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A Note on Varying Mutation Rates in 2 x 2 Coordination Games
Tieman, Alexander F.; Houba, Harold - EconWPA - 1998
The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407626
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Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Krishna, Vijay - EconWPA - 1998
A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders, but need not be identical and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062330
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Through Trial & Error to Collusion
Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans-Theo; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1998
In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that this process converges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062333
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Vote Splitting as Insurance Against Uncertainty
Bugarin, Mauricio - EconWPA - 1998
The present paper offers a racional choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062374
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Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players
Sethi, Rajiv - EconWPA - 1998
One approach to the modeling of bounded rationality in strategic environments is based on the dynamics of evolution and learning in games. An entirely different approach has been developed recently by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). This latter approach is static and equilibrium based, but relies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062384
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Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
Barberà, Salvador; Maschler, Michael; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1998
We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions: the founders and the candidates are fixed; the society operates for $k$ periods and holds elections at the beginning of each period; one vote is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118533
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Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model
Tieman, Alexander F.; Houba, Harold; Laan, Gerard van der - EconWPA - 1998
We consider a local interaction model with a population on an h dimensional torus, in which in each round of play a random player gets a learning draw. This player plays a k+1 action stage game with players in his neighborhood, compares his own average payoff with the average payoff of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118616
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Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly
Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - EconWPA - 1998
We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. Firms learn about their competitive environment from the quantities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118631
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Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment
Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - EconWPA - 1998
This paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes, and who maximises profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time. We show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes, determined by the discount rate and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118645
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A Framework for Studying Economic Interactions (with applications to corruption and business cycles)
Verbrugge, Randal J. - EconWPA - 1998
Most economic models implicitly or explicitly assume that interactions between economic agents are 'global' - in other words, each agent interacts in a uniform manner with every other agent. However, localized interactions between microeconomic agents are a pervasive feature of reality. What are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407546
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