This paper studies a two-player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the ``pie'' bargained over. I show how this feature can result in an increase of the cost of rejecting an offer for the ``non-harming player''. Beside the...

Two refinements, called value oriented equilibria, of the Nash equilibrium concept are proposed for repeated games of complete information. Value sufficient equilibria make each player's strategic response to the another player's previous actions depend only on the value of those actions to the...

Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to...

It would be interesting and scientifically rewarding to investigate the possibilities of designing a "sheltered" situation room for the Information Technologies and Telecommunications services and products market. The proposed framework might be employed during any phase of the life cycle of an...

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to...

We present a synthesis of various folk theorems for repeated games.

This paper examines sets of Nash equilibria in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In {\em partial common interest games} they contain only informative equilibria. The stability requirement sharpens currently available...

This paper studies the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. The paper identifies stable outcomes under population learning dynamics in which individuals with some probability replace...

Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the...

This paper suggests a reason, other than asymmetric information, why agency contracts are not explicitly contingent on the agent's performance or actions. Two ingredients are essential to this reason. The first is the written form that contracts are required to take to be enforceable. The second...