Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) presented the first general model and solution concept for the multiperson cooperative theory. Stable set theory is viewed as only one of several approaches for analyzing coalitional games. This chapter focuses on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, describes...

This chapter discusses the games that are two-sided matching markets. The phrase two-sided refers to the fact that agents in such markets belong, from the outset, to one of two disjoint sets-e.g, firms or workers. The term matching refers to the bilateral nature of exchange in these markets. The...

This chapter discusses the core in imperfectly competitive economies, and presents the study of mixed markets that includes in particular the study of alternative cooperative game-theoretic solution concepts in the framework of mixed markets and the problem of approximating mixed markets by...

This chapter presents the results on the cores of perfectly competitive exchange economies, that is economies in which the endowment of each agent is negligible on the scale of the whole economy. In the contributions of Edgeworth, Debreu and Scarf, and Aumann, the conclusion is: the core (in...

The core is, the most intuitive solution concept in cooperative game theory. An intuitively acceptable axiom system for the core might reinforce its position as the most natural" solution. An axiomatization of the core may serve two other, more important goals: (1) by obtaining axioms for the...

Of all solution concepts of cooperative games, the core is probably the easiest to understand. It is the set of all feasible outcomes (payoffs) that no player (participant) or group of participants (coalition) can improve upon by acting for themselves. Once an agreement in the core has been...

This chapter focuses on the patent licensing. Game-theoretic methods have made it possible to address questions with regard to patent licensing. The common modes of patent licensing are a royalty, possibly nonuniform, per unit of output produced with the patented technology, a fixed fee that is...

This chapter discusses the strategic models of entry deterrence that the models fall into three categories: (1) Preemptionthese models explain how a firm claims and preserves monopoly position. The incumbent obtains a dominant position by arriving first in a natural monopoly, or more generally,...

This chapter focuses on the most game-theoretic elements of location theory. Spatial competition is an expanding field lying at the interface of game theory, economics, and regional science. It is still in its infancy but attracts more and more scholars' interest because the competitive location...

This chapter describes several forms of auctions, presents the formulations used in the main models, reviews some of the general results and empirical findings, and indicates a few applications. Auctions have been used for millennia, and remain the simplest and most familiar means of price...