Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r 1 “production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as...

We consider optimal consumption and portfolio choice in the presence of Knightian uncertainty in continuous-time. We embed the problem into the new framework of stochastic calculus for such settings, dealing in particular with the issue of non-equivalent multiple priors. We solve the problem...

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single 'aggregate belief system' and (ii) when an individual whose belief system is...

This paper analyzes the implications of right-to-manage wage bargaining between a producers' syndicate and a workers' union representing finite numbers of identical members in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS-AD type with government activity. At given prices and price expectations,...

We refine the discretization of G-expectation by Y. Dolinsky, M.Nutz, and M. Soner (Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 122 (2012), 664-675), in order to obtain a discretization of sublinear expectation where the martingale laws are defined on a finite lattice rather than the whole set...

We propose a dynamic auction mechanism for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods. These goods can be split into two distinct sets so that items in each set are substitutes but complementary to items in the other set. The seller has a reserve value for each bundle of...

This work takes a closer look on the predominant assumption in usual lemon market models of having finitely many or even only two different levels of quality. We model a situation which is close to the classical monopolistic setting but admits an interval of possible quality values....