We run a computerised experiment of network formation where allconnections are bene…cial and only direct links are costly. Players simul-taneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when bothplayers involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally gen-erated data to test...

If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long{term employment is risky, withthe risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long{term employment can result either from oering long{term contracts or from repeatedlyand mutually opting for rematching....

Using a choice experiment, this paper investigates how Swedish citizens value three environmental quality objectives. In addition, a follow-up question is used to investigate whether respondents ignored any attributes when responding. The resulting information is used in the model estimation by...

Economics and management science share the tradition of ordering risk aversionby fitting the best expected utility (EU) model with a certain utility function to in-dividual data, and then using the utility curvature for each individual as the soleindex of risk attitude. (Cumulative) Prospect...

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

In experimental economics there exists a lively debate about the independenceof observations. Although opinions on the issue dier widely, allconcerns regard the independence of subjects' behavior within one sessionor experiment. This paper attempts to shed some light on the independenceof...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion inthe standard prisoner’s dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychologicalbehaviors. This concept enables to take account each player’s assessmentof the other player’s behavior and the asymmetry of information....

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by out-comes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, whereprocedures are dened independently of an outcome. To that end, wedesign procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry thesame information on other's...

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, andfrom other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competitionare substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowingthem to replace rent-seeking rulers. But...