In London, at the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (LSE), a symposium was held on 6 December 1997 - the anniversary of the day when the members of Iwakura's delegation were received by Queen Victoria. Comprising four lectures the symposium was...

A joint symposium between the Japan Society and the London School of Economics and Political Science was held in the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines on 9 July 1999 to mark the centenary of Treaty Revision in Japan. In the Bakumatsu period of the...

On 6 February 1998 a symposium was held in STICERD on Aspects of the Russo-Japanese War at which two papers were presented: 'The Japanese Military during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05: A Reconsideration of Command Politics and Public Images', by Dr Lone, and 'British Observers of the...

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

We consider an infinite-horizon inter-generational economy with identical agents differing only in their inherited wealth and with a constant-returns-to-scale technology using capital and labour (called quot;effortquot;) and displaying a purely idiosyncratic risk. If effort is contractible, full...

This paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms' private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The paper...

In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex-ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex-post the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred, and decides...

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the...