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Year of publication
Subject
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econometrics 8 econometric models 5 INSURANCE 4 COMPETITION 3 ECONOMIC MODELS 3 evaluation 3 CONTRACTS 2 CULTURE 2 ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 RISK 2 SOCIETY 2 assurance 2 least squares 2 ADVERSE SELECTION 1 ASSURANCE 1 BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 1 CORRUPTION 1 COSTS 1 COUTS 1 CURRENCIES 1 ECONOMETRICS 1 ETHNIC GROUPS 1 EXCHANGE RATE 1 FRANCE 1 GOVERNMENT 1 HEALTH INSURANCE 1 LIFE CYCLE 1 MALADIES 1 MARCHE FINANCIER 1 MARRIAGE 1 MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS 1 MINORITY GROUPS 1 MONETARY UNION 1 MONEY 1 MONOPOLIES 1 NATURAL SELECTION 1 PREFERENCES 1 RELIGION 1 SOCIAL WELFARE 1 UNCERTAINTY 1
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Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 34
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Undetermined 34
Author
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Verdier, T. 6 RILSTONE, P. 5 Bisin, A. 4 Chiappori, P.A. 4 Masson, A. 3 Arrondel, L. 2 BOLDUC, D. 2 CARMICHAEL, B. 2 Fluet, C. 2 Martimort, D. 2 Arnott, R. 1 Asheim, G.B. 1 Chassagnon, A. 1 Covas, F. 1 Evans, G.E. 1 FONTAINE, G. 1 Flori, Y.A. 1 Gardner, R. 1 Geoffard, P.Y. 1 Guaitoli, D. 1 Guesnerie, R. 1 Kessler, D. 1 LAFERRIERE, R. 1 MOHNEN, P. 1 Macho, I. 1 Nilssen, T. 1 Nunes, L.C. 1 POOLE, E. 1 Pannequin, F. 1 Rey, p. 1 Salanie, B. 1 Stiglitz, J. 1 TRUCHON, M. 1 VIGEANT, S. 1 Villeneuve, B. 1 Waller, C.J. 1 de Garidel, T. 1 de Macedo, J.B. 1
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Institution
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Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie 34
Published in...
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Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie 34
Source
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RePEc 34
Showing 1 - 10 of 34
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The Internal Organization of the Firm, Transaction Costs and Macroeconomic Growth.
Martimort, D.; Verdier, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
This paper proposes an analysis of the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face agency costs. These agency costs are due to the existence of asymmetries of information and the formation of internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005475109
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Corruption: Top Down or Bottom Up?.
Waller, C.J.; Verdier, T.; Gardner, R. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
We study the degree of corruption in a hierarchical model of government. In particular, we explore the question of whether adding a layer of government simply increases the total amount of corruption or generates an organizational efficiency (via a principal-agent relationship between levels of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005475112
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Agents with Imperfect Empathy May Survive Natural Selection.
Bisin, A.; Verdier, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
Cultural transmission mechanisms which favor the direct transmission of the parents traits to their children may be adaptative to natural selection when opposed to mechanisms in which the parents choose for the offspring the highest fitness at any time. This is so, in particular, in environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005475114
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Moving the Escudo into the Euro.
de Macedo, J.B.; Nunes, L.C.; Covas, F. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
The paper documents how the code of conduct implied by membership of the escudo in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the Europan Monetary System (ERM) allowed Portugal to qualify for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), ultimately moving the currency into the euro. This unwritten code of conduct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005475118
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Monopolies Life Cycle, Bureaucratization and Schumpeterian Growth.
Martimort, D.; Verdier, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
This paper analyzes the links between the internal organization of firms and macroeconomic growth. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which firms face dynamic agency costs. These agency costs are due to the formation of vertical collusions within the organization. To respond to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776197
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Coordination on Saddle Path Solutions: the Eductive Viewpoint. 1- Linear Univariate Models.
Evans, G.E.; Guesnerie, R. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
We investigate local strong rationality (LSR) in a one step forward looking univariate model with memory one. Eductive arguments are used to determine when common knowledge (CK) that the solution is near some perfect foresight path is sufficient to trigger complete coordination on that path...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625791
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Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits.
Bisin, A.; Verdier, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
This paper presents an economic analysis of the intergenerational transmission of ethnic and religious traits through family socialization and marital segregation decisions. Frequency of intra-group marriage (homogamy), as well as socialization rates of religious and ethnic groups, depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625793
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A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology.
Bisin, A.; Verdier, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1999
In this paper we present a model of cultural transmission of preferences on goods some of which are provided publicly through simple majority voting. We emphasize the existence of a two way causality between socialization decisions and political outcomes. This generates the possiblity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625801
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Welfare-Improving Asymmetric Information in a Dynamic Insurance Market
de Garidel, T. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1997
We provide a two-period model of competition in insurance market under incomplete information. Each agent, together with his initial insurer, learns about his type through accidents, but other insurers may not, depending on informational structures. We show that (i) keeping information about...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625800
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Insurance Contracts Under Adverse Selection with Random Loss Severity.
Fluet, C.; Pannequin, F. - Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005625790
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