We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. If the second mover is informed,...

This paper brings together views on choice making as have been developed in philosophy, psychology, and economics. Starting from specific examples the relative merits of different approaches are discussed. The conclusion that models of boundedly rational behavior are the future of social science...

We consider a society composed of two regions. Each of them pro-vides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries.In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a regionare spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two...

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently fail to identify the normative solutionsin logical reasoning tasks. Much attention has been devoted to the study ofthese deviations at the individual level; less effort was exerted to investigate whetherinstitutional settings might facilitate...

An empirically well-established finding is that equity portfolios are concentratedin the domestic equity market of the investor. Previous theoreticaland empirical analyses have mainly focused on institutional explanations andlargely neglected individual behavior. In this study we report the...

In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors prdecting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandandi, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...

We examine the explanatory power of cascade models by implementing the BDM-mechanism in a simple cascade experiment in which subject have to decide on the prediction of a randomly choasen urn. Assigned price limits to participate in the prediction game are used as indicators of subjective...

We investigate the intertemporal and interpersonal allocation behavior ofspouses with different deterministic life expectations in an experiment. In eachperiod of their life both partners propose a consumption level one of which isthen randomly implemented. In spite of the complex dynamics...

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic pre-play communication (no, one-way, and two-way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargaining out-comes are influenced by...

To commit credibly in bargaining is crucial: In the ultimatum game with its one-sided early commitment power the “proposer” gets (nearly) the whole pie while the “responder” is left with (almost) nothing. When both parties commit simultaneously the (a)symmetric Nash(1950)-bargaining...