A firm with stochastic demand can rely on hired hands when demand is low and rent additionallabour when demand is higher. For high demand this implies the co-employmentof hired hands, paid directly by the firm, and of rented hands who are paid by a rentalagency. This may cause severe problems if...

This study investigates the dynamic efficiency of an emissionregulation regime where companies competitively pay for emissionlicences. We embed the emission licence market in a Cournotmodel where the price of emission licences is subject to strategictradeoff between licences and abatement...

The present research experimentally examines the ininfluence of groupidentity on trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment,group identity is manipulated only through the creation of artificial(minimal) groups. In other treatments group members are additionallyrelated by outcome...

Fairness like other social norms is usually stabilized by punishing norm deviations. Reward uncertainty, however,questions whether norm deviations can be detected and thus punished. By investing in information acquisition, aresponder in an ultimatum experiment determines endogenously whether...

We compared the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum....

We investigate the intertemporal allocation behavior of spouses with different deterministic life expectations in an experiment. In each period of their life both partners propose a consumption level of which one is then randomly implemented. In spite of the complex dynamics optimal behavior is...

In a cascade experiment subjects are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). Using the BDM mechanism we study subjects' probability assignments based on price limits for participating in the prediction game. We...

We experimentally test overconfidence in investment decisions by offering partic- ipants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices. Overall, 149 subjects participated in two experiments, one with just one risky as- set, the other with two risky assets....

This study investigates the dynamic efficiency of an emission regulation regime where companies competitively pay for emission licences. We embed the emission licence market in a Cournot model where the price of emission licences is subject to strategic tradeoff between licences and abatement...

We adopt an evolutionary approach to investigate whether and when conditional cooperation can explain the voluntary contribution phenomenon often observed in public goods experiments and real life. Formally, conditional cooperation is captured by a regret parameter describing how much an...