There are two ways for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes: legally, through tax optimization and illegally, through tax evasion. The government reacts by altering the law, and by conducting audits, respectively. These phenomena are modeled as a population game, a strategic interaction between all...

This paper considers the realized returns of individual investors in warrants and leverage certificates. First, we derive a general formula that analytically decomposes the return into several economically meaningful components that are related to investor's trading behavior and the issuers'...

When purchasing a financial product, investors may actively decide upon the risk they take. This paper analyzes the impact of investors' personal characteristics, location-based demographic factors and transaction-specific trading surroundings on their risk taking in the market of speculative...

In this paper, we present a review of tax research in accounting. We outline U.S. GAAP accounting rules for the following four income tax notes and survey the area of research literature dealing with the information content provided by U.S. GAAP: (1) unrecognized tax benefits, (2) valuation...

We propose a game theoretical model where a multinational company with divisions in two countries and the respective tax authorities interact with each other. Prior to an audit the functional profile of the divisions is unknown to the tax authorities. In equilibrium, tax avoidance emerges in...

We propose a game-theoretic investigation to capture the interplay between the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity. Our purpose is to provide answers to two research questions: Which aspects of the strategic interaction between the players...

This paper studies a unique traffic law enforcement campaign in Germany and its impact on road safety. Key features of the campaign are (1) repeated one-day lasting massive speed limit monitoring (so called Blitzmarathons) and (2) a media campaign that informs the public in advance about the...

We carry out an experiment on a macroeconomic price setting game where prices are complements. Despite relevant information being common knowledge and price flexibility we observe significant deviation from equilibrium prices and history dependence. In a first treatment we observe that...

The pursuit of individual rents by political representatives is recognized as one of the major shortcomings of political systems. While both legal and illegal types of rents are distributed by political decisions, research has focused primarily on illegal rent-seeking by politicians. This...

Remuneration for politicians has been discussed frequently and thus, has been the subject of many reforms in recent decades. Remuneration has an influence on whether or not citizens choose to run for office as well as the amount of effort they might invest once elected. In this paper, I...