This article studies design competition in government procurements by developing a model of two-dimensional auctions, where firms bid on both price and quality, and bids are evaluated by a scoring rule designed by a buyer. Three auction schemes -- first score, second score, and second preferred...

I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the incumbent's price-setting game, while...

Often, consumers do not observe a firm's cost-reducing investment decision. The investment incentive can be weakened when product quality is unobservable before purchase because consumers do not know whether a lower price arises from lower costs or lower quality. This articles examines this...

This article examines the implications of fixed-price reimbursement of providers for access to hospice care by Medicare beneficiaries. Hospices that are offered higher reimbursement rates by Medicare are found to be more likely to become certified to provide care under the Medicare Hospice...