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Year of publication
Subject
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Theorie 813 Theory 813 USA 288 United States 288 Agency theory 105 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 105 Asymmetric information 87 Asymmetrische Information 87 Market entry 80 Markteintritt 80 Preismanagement 79 Pricing strategy 79 Oligopol 72 Oligopoly 72 Game theory 68 Spieltheorie 68 Consumer behaviour 65 Konsumentenverhalten 65 Competition 63 Monopol 62 Monopoly 62 Wettbewerb 62 Auktionstheorie 61 Regulation 61 Regulierung 61 Auction theory 60 Innovation 52 Preiswettbewerb 48 Price competition 48 Market structure 47 Marktstruktur 47 Leistungsanreiz 45 Performance incentive 45 Product quality 45 Produktqualität 45 Patent 43 Moral Hazard 42 Moral hazard 41 Merger 40 Fusion 39
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Online availability
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Undetermined 1,122 Free 42
Type of publication
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Article 3,773 Book / Working Paper 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1,426 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1,426 Article 7 Collection of articles of several authors 5 Sammelwerk 5 Conference proceedings 3 Konferenzschrift 3 Market information 1 Marktinformation 1
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Language
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Undetermined 2,182 English 1,592
Author
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Tirole, Jean 49 Daughety, Andrew F. 35 Martimort, David 31 Lewis, Tracy R. 30 Chen, Yongmin 25 Inderst, Roman 25 Rey, Patrick 24 Biglaiser, Gary 23 Che, Yeon-Koo 23 Hermalin, Benjamin E. 23 Jullien, Bruno 23 Reinganum, Jennifer F. 23 Schankerman, Mark 22 Borenstein, Severin 20 Laffont, Jean-Jacques 20 Bagwell, Kyle 19 Choi, Jay Pil 19 Whinston, Michael D. 19 Riordan, Michael H. 18 Scotchmer, Suzanne 18 Farrell, Joseph 17 Fershtman, Chaim 17 Spier, Kathryn E. 17 Doraszelski, Ulrich 16 Dranove, David 16 Jehiel, Philippe 16 Saloner, Garth 16 Shepard, Andrea 16 Vives, Xavier 16 Waldman, Michael 16 Besanko, David 15 Katz, Michael L. 15 Klemperer, Paul 15 Sappington, David E.M. 15 Shapiro, Carl 15 Gilbert, Richard J. 14 Gowrisankaran, Gautam 14 Lerner, Josh 14 Reinganum, Jennifer Freidel 14 Shaffer, Greg 14
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Institution
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Institut d'Économie Industrielle <Toulouse> 1 Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung Strategische Interaktion 1 Symposium on the Economics of the Internet and Software Industries <2001, Toulouse> 1
Published in...
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The Rand journal of economics 2,290 RAND Journal of Economics 1,323 The RAND Journal of Economics 160 Symposium on the economics of organization 13 Discussion Paper 1 Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik - Papers on Strategic Interaction 1 RAND Journal of Economics, 36(4) 2002, 890-907 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1,433 RePEc 1,323 OLC EcoSci 857 Other ZBW resources 153 EconStor 7 USB Cologne (business full texts) 1
Showing 3,331 - 3,340 of 3,774
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Damage Measures and Incomplete Contracts
Leitzel, Jim - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 1, pp. 92-101
I present a model of two-party contracts that allows for incomplete specification of future states and actions. I examine various damage measures under the assumption that courts protect only reasonable reliance expenditures so that parties make efficient reliance choices. The expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353969
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Split Awards, Procurement, and Innovation
Anton, James J.; Yao, Dennis A. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 4, pp. 538-552
In many procurement settings, it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers. In this article, we develop a model of split-award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous. We characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353973
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Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry
Borenstein, Severin - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 3, pp. 344-365
This article estimates the importance of route and airport dominance in determining the degree of market power exercised by an airline. The results indicate that an airline's share of passengers on a route and at the endpoint airports significantly influences its ability to mark up price above...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353976
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Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration
Hendricks, Kenneth; Kovenock, Dan - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 2, pp. 164-182
In this article we examine the effect of private information and information externalties on the ex post efficiency of investment in oil exploration. We show that too much drilling tends to occur if firms believe that the area is likely to contain a sizeable pool of oil, and too little drilling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353986
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Noisy Juries and the Choice of Trial Mode in a Sequential Signalling Game: Theory and Evidence
Gay, Gerald D.; Grace, Martin F.; Kale, Jayant R.; Noe, … - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 2, pp. 196-213
In this article we attempt to determine the impact of a defendant's strategic choice of trial mode on the judicial process. In a sequential signalling game setting, we model a criminal trial using varying assumptions regarding the sophistication of the agents, while maintaining the assumption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353998
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Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation
Sibley, David - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 3, pp. 392-404
A regulatory incentive mechanism is presented in which the regulated firm has superior information about both cost and demand, compared to the regulator. The mechanism leads to truthful revelation of the demand function and extracts all rents due to private demand information in a nondistorting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005354014
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A Comparison of Hospital Responses to Reimbursement Policies for Medicaid Psychiatric Patients
Frank, Richard G.; Lave, Judith R. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 4, pp. 588-600
Hospital expenditures continue to increase at rates that are higher than that of GNP growth. Policymakers are experimenting with a number of reimbursement methods in an attempt to curtail the growth in hospital costs. This article empirically assesses the impact of various hospital reimbursement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357092
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Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results
Cooper, Russell; DeJong, Douglas V.; Forsythe, Robert; … - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 4, pp. 568-587
We report experimental results on the role of preplay communication in a one-shot, symmetric battle of the sexes game. We conducted games in which there was no communication, and we studied the effects of three different communication structures: one-way communication with one round of messages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357101
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An Empirical Test of the Comparative and Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law
White, Michelle J. - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 3, pp. 308-330
Scholars in the field of law and economics have developed an extensive theoretical literature on the effects of liability rules in accident law, but have done little testing of their theoretical models. In this article, I develop an empirically testable model of the incentives for injurers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357102
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Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation
Shavell, Steven - In: RAND Journal of Economics 20 (1989) 2, pp. 183-195
In this article the voluntary sharing of information prior to settlement negotiations is studied in a model where one type of litigant -- plaintiffs, to be exact -- possesses private information. In equilibrium, plaintiffs whose expected judgments would exceed a certain threshold will reveal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005357124
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