We consider a single-output production economy in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology. Under increasing returns to scale, the corresponding cooperative game (without side payments) is convex, and hence has a large core. We propose a core selection that is obtained by...

This article considers the problem of managing multispecies fishing industries as one of regulating the production of individual multiproduct firms. The multispecies New England otter trawl industry is examined within this framework. Empirical results derived from estimating a multiproduct...

This article develops a model allowing asymmetric information between two bidders in an auction for a common-value object. It supposes that there is a common prior distribution on the object's value and that each bidder receives a private signal conditional on the object's unknown true value....

This article analyzes the investment response of incumbents to new entry in 39 chemical product industries. The behavior of incumbents in highly concentrated industries differed from that of incumbents in low-concentration industries. In concentrated industries incumbents increased their rate of...

This article focuses on the decisionmaking role of management under the assumption that managers are fallible and thus make honest decision errors. In our model the owner of the firm must decide how to structure management, how many managers to hire, and what decisionmaking rule to adopt to...

This article examines a two-period differentiated-products duopoly in which consumers are partially "locked in" by switching costs that they face in the second period. While these switching costs naturally make demand more inelastic in the second period, they also do so in the first period,...

This article presents a model of credible, voluntary, collective agreements in a dynamic game. These agreements are implicit in collections of history-dependent (threat) strategies. I consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation. Credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium....

Environmental regulation takes place in a world in which firms search for least-cost adaptations to emission standards. Firms may substitute inputs, change the desired level of output, or defy the standard, if they perceive enforcement to be lax. This article estimates the impact of...

I present a game-theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most-favored-customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices. The reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak...

We consider a regulatory problem in which there is a hierarchy of control. Consumers (or Congress) direct the activities of a regulator, who, in turn, oversees the activities of a monopolistic firm. Both the regulator and the firm are self-interested actors. The regulator must be motivated to...